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RESEARCH & DEBATE
STILL WORTH DYING FOR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE NATURE OF STRATEGY
P. H. Liotta
I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to James Miskel’s well written if
logically flawed essay mistitled “National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catch-
phrases?” (in the Autumn 2002 issue of this journal). The substance of his essay,
after all, is not just about the evident “value” of national interests; Miskel, rather,
questions why presidential administrations publish and revise national security
strategies, per congressional mandate, over the course of their terms. In present-
ing his case, he conflates the distinction between in-
terests and objectives; consistently misses several
truths that the Bush administration’s National Secu-
rity Strategy of 17 September 2002 recognizes as en-
during; misstates the analytical perspectives of
liberalism and realism; and offers an interpretation of
national interests and the nature of strategy that is
both narrow and deterministic.1
Yet, before proceeding farther, I should admit an
obvious bias in my response. Jim Miskel is a close per-
sonal friend and a colleague for whom I hold great
respect. While we have certainly disagreed on funda-
mental strategic issues before, my concern for bias
here is not that I will be harsh in my comments but
that I will not be harsh enough.
My greatest contention with Miskel’s argument lies
in the beginning and the conclusion of his essay,
where he opines, “The congressional requirement for
unclassified national security reports has clearly
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proven to have little value in terms of furthering the debate. Congress would do
well to consider whether the public interest would be better served if national se-
curity reports were required only once in a presidential term—on the assump-
tion that interests and strategies do not, or at least should not, change annually. . . .
Implicit in [this debate] . . . are two assumptions. One is that national interests
can be defined precisely. . . . The second assumption is that statesmen actually at-
tempt to define national interests with precision.”2
WHAT’S GOING ON?
MISSING THE GRAND PURPOSE BY FOCUSING ON
THE CATCHPHRASE
While there are some basic truths in Miskel’s skillfully worded sentences—
namely, that national security strategies are marketing strategies of administra-
tion achievements as much as clear statements of strategic vision—the flaws in
Miskel’s argument seem apparent as well.
First, Miskel fails to recognize that U.S. national interests, far from what he
terms “vague platitudes,” are in fact long-term, enduring, abstract principles
that are embedded in the U.S. Constitution.3 Secondly, Miskel’s suggestion that
national security strategies are simply expressions of national interests is just
plain wrong. National security strategies are presidential declarations of strate-
gic interests and policy objectives, as well as explanations of the means offered to
achieve these ends. Objectives, therefore—which Miskel never recognizes in his
essay as distinct from interests—are the goals of policy, meant to secure
long-term, abstract strategic interests.
Miskel’s failure to distinguish, or recognize a difference, between abstract in-
terests and short-term objectives seriously weakens his argument. At the most
fundamental level, basic national interests are enduring and unlikely to change
over time: to guarantee the security and prosperity of the nation-state. It ought
to be obvious to even the most casual observer of international affairs that the
involvement of the United States in the global landscape is also a critical aspect
of its national interests; rightly or wrongly, we cannot secure our interests with-
out our involvement in the international arena. Thus, the fundamental “model
for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,” which forms the
initial template for the Bush National Security Strategy (or NSS), differs little
from the previous administration’s emphasis on “engagement” in the globally
interdependent environment and “enlargement” of democratic communities
throughout the world.4 The three “strategic postures” of the previous NSS only
emphasize this essential interest orientation: “Enhancing Security at Home
and Abroad,” “Promoting Prosperity,” and “Promoting Democracy.” (Despite
Miskel’s rejection of these postures as a “laundry list of bromides and unfulfilled
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wishes,” the previous administration deserves credit for its emphasis on home-
land security—which has become the central focus of the latest national secu-
rity, and which was largely ignored or given far less significant priority in
previous national strategies.)
How one achieves that security and prosperity is not always obvious; one
must rely on specific policy objectives meant to secure these interests. Therefore,
while the interests of the Clinton administration and of the current administra-
tion, for example, are decidedly similar in their purposes, their objectives are de-
cidedly at odds. Consider these key areas of policy objective differences—
despite similar declarations of national interests—between the 1999 Clinton
strategy and the 2002 Bush strategy, as given in figure 1.
Thirdly, Miskel actually seems serious in suggesting that such speeches as the
30 January 2002 address, to which he refers as the “axis of evil” speech, are more
“useful” and “clarifying” than the publication of national security strategies he
broadly dismisses as “collective arm [twisting]” and that are published “without
enthusiasm.” He further claims that the “axis of evil” speech—which he never
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once refers to as the president’s first State of the Union address, much else of
which no one seems to remember, let alone quote—is “a positive step in terms of
debating and defining more rigorously than usual [our] national interests.”5
To be sure, the State of the Union address did indeed provoke a vigorous de-
bate about terrorists, weapons, and tyrants. But Miskel performs some enter-
taining leaps of faith in suggesting that the “‘axis of evil’ epithet”—which is
nothing more than a specific platitude—is “preferable to platitudes about the
survival and vitality of the United States.” Significantly, the Bush administration
distanced itself in its 17 September national strategy from the claims made in the
previous State of the Union address. Iran, for example—part of President Bush’s
“axis of evil”—is not even mentioned as a rogue state in the NSS. Iraq and North
Korea, further, have historically shown that they understand deterrence; in Oc-
tober 2002, North Korea admitted to nuclear-weapons status and professed to
seek a “diplomatic solution.” President Bush has also publicly stated that neither
North Korea nor Iran were candidate targets for U.S.-initiated use of force. So
much for the value of speeches instead of strategies . . .
Miskel’s argument again suffers when he fails to acknowledge that the
Clinton and Bush administrations each published its various strategy revisions
when it felt both compelled and ready to publish them, not on an annual basis.
(The first Clinton national security strategy, for example, went through
twenty-one drafts prior to its 1994 publication.)6 Further, Bush’s national secu-
rity adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has repeatedly emphasized the critical impor-
tance of the National Security Strategy and was quite emphatic in her enthusiasm
for its publication.7 Further, Rice has publicly stated that—aside from the “axis
of evil” designation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—there are certainly more
than three “rogue states” in the world, though “it’s probably best not to name
them. . . . Countries can change their behavior, I suppose.”8
Finally, the heated debate on the preeminence of U.S. armed forces, by which
adversaries will be dissuaded from pursuing “military buildup[s] in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States,” has put into print a con-
viction that has been present since early drafts of the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance (under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney).
Stating such a position in a national strategy, which is a claim to primacy, makes
clear an administration’s position and relative emphasis on aspects of national
interests in a way no other official document, or speech, could.
As further proof of why national strategies should be open to debate (and in-
evitably will undergo subsequent revisions), much attention has focused on the
Bush strategy’s emphasis on preemption. While the Bush National Security
Strategy does not suggest preempting China, Russia, India, or other major pow-
ers, it argues for preemption against terrorists, in terms not radically different
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from the strategies employed by previous administrations. But the Bush strategy
becomes more debatable regarding “rogue states,” where it rests, according to a
recent Brookings Institution policy brief, on a disputed conjecture that “deter-
rence based upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against the leaders
of rogue states willing to take risks.”9 Equally, the Bush national strategy pro-
vides no guidance on when to preempt, fails to acknowledge that a preemptive
attack could cause the very attacks it seeks to prevent (in the Middle East or on
the Korean Peninsula, for example), and may allow “partners” against terrorism
merely to settle private national security differences—as Russia has already
hinted it is ready to do in Georgia. Even Henry Kissinger argues that “it cannot
be either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop princi-
ples that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own
definition of threats to its security.”10
Surely, then, there is a necessity, in declaring the significance of national in-
terests to strategy, to pronounce why. Such declarations of interests are hardly
bromides, wish lists, or platitudes. Such interests stem from the analytical per-
spective of the decision maker, yet Miskel may have simplified too cleanly in dis-
tinguishing these perspectives—as the next section briefly suggests.
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS?
CONFUSING PERSPECTIVES, CONFOUNDING ANALYSIS
Before presenting an argument on the necessity of national interests, I would
like to question Miskel’s broad description of “the two basic schools of thought
about how national interests should be defined,” which he offers as realism
(whose “avatars” are von Bismarck and Nixon, and who would favor military
force as the most tangible form of power for the state) and Kantian idealists or
liberals (though he never actually gives a name to the latter but credits both
Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin as being members of that “school”).
Miskel’s analysis is clear and readable, but it is also wrong. Numerous advocates
of realism, particularly those of the strategic-primacy bent (such as Robert
Kagan), would strongly support U.S. and NATO intervention in the Balkans, de-
spite Miskel’s argument to the contrary. Indeed, such realists would argue that
U.S. intervention came too late, rather than that it should not have occurred at all.
Thus, to claim that only the Wilson “idealists” favored intervention in
Rwanda or the Balkans is simply not correct. On the one hand, the Clinton ad-
ministration, which Miskel implies was more infected by the idealist school than
by realism, had clear intelligence and probable foreknowledge of genocide but
chose not to act for any number of reasons—to include an assessment of
Rwanda as not in the realm of defined, stated, vital, or important national secu-
rity interests.11 In the same vein, it is a clear truth that—unlike Somalia or
L I O T T A 1 2 7
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Rwanda—vital national interests were at stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in
Kosovo: the U.S. commitment to NATO (a permanent alliance) and the preven-
tion of spillover of conflict into neighboring states, including NATO members
Greece and Turkey. Humanitarianism, therefore, was not the only reason we in-
tervened in the Balkans. Moreover, Miskel’s analysis that U.S. interests were “un-
certain” during the “air war on Serbia in 2000”—which was actually not a war,
took place in 1999 against Yugoslavia (not just Serbia), and was set to become a
ground intervention as well if airpower did not succeed—is flatly misdirected.
Miloševiæ knew exactly what would happen to him; he simply had no other
choice left and had to hope for the best.
I acknowledge the merit in much of Miskel’s subsequent focus in his essay,
which centers on the Arab-Israeli conflict and draws upon the dynamics of the
domestic political process and the “marketing of the American public and Con-
gress.” But his focus, like his analysis of the dynamics of the realist and liberal
schools, is far too narrow.
By my last count, there are at least seventeen “schools” of analytical perspec-
tives. All of them—and I can hear many of our colleagues, most not well
grounded in international relations theory, already screaming their denials—
have some form of influence on national security decision making. After all, the
most “Wilsonian” of presidents in the last half of the twentieth century, as schol-
ars such as G. John Ikenberry have repeatedly argued, was Ronald Reagan.12 Fur-
ther, and to be blunt, the “realism” of Richard Nixon has almost no place in the
administration of George Walker Bush. To the contrary, the current administra-
tion and the political debate that centers around its national strategy is primarily
divided between three “schools”: the realists, the liberals, and the moralists (or,
more correctly, the idealists). The moralists are firm in their belief that spread-
ing American “values” and American democracy will best achieve the ends of
our national security, and thus far, both in the declaration of national interests
and in the execution of national strategy to remake the world and to win the war
on terror, they appear to be carrying the day.13
TO DIE FOR: NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE
NATURE OF STRATEGY
The national interest, admittedly, is a pretty slippery concept. Yet how one views,
focuses on, and consistently acts upon such interest will prove the true test of
larger “grand” strategic perspectives. The bottom line, after all, remains un-
changed: what a nation wants and its citizens are willing to go to war over—and
to die for—remains unchanged as a fundamental interest.
Miskel is not the first scholar to argue forcefully that there can be no agree-
ment among Americans themselves about what constitutes the national interest.
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Peter Trubowitz, in a study meant to define the meaning of American national
interests, came to the conclusion that those “who assume that America has a dis-
cernible national interest whose defense should determine its relations with
other nations are unable to explain the persistent failure to achieve domestic
consensus on international objectives.”14 Others, such as historian Martin van
Creveld, have become more cynical about the utility of interest:
To say that peoples go to war for their “interests,” and that “interest” comprises
whatever any society considers good and useful for itself, is as self-evident as it is
trite. Saying so means that we regard our particular modern combination of might
and right as eternally valid instead of taking it for what it really is, a historical phe-
nomenon with a clear beginning and presumably an end. Even if we do assume that
men are always motivated by their interests, there are no good grounds for assuming
that the things that are bundled together under this rubric will necessarily be the
same in the future as they are today. . . . The logic of strategy itself requires that the
opponent’s motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war.
If, in the process, the notion of interest has to be thrown overboard, then so be it.15
Yet surely the purpose of any administration is to set the tone for leadership
by declaring specific interests in writing, and by showing demonstrated com-
mitment to those writings. The best possible way to do this is through the publi-
cation and revision of a national strategy. This is not to say that employment of
the traditional military, economic, and political instruments of power ought to
continue in the ad hoc manner in which they were applied during the 1990s. Re-
garding the military instrument in particular, Kissinger noted in late 1999, with
particular reference to the Kosovo engagement, “I am uneasy with the readiness
with which the military instrument is being used as the key solution for humani-
tarian crises.”16 Yet this potential weakness also emphasizes the extraordinary
magnitude of American strength at the beginning of the twenty-first century:
There are few countries or crises that can threaten American vital interests. Yet our
“sole superpower” status means the U.S. will continue to use its influence, and per-
haps its military forces, to save lives, right wrongs, and keep the peace. . . . We are in
an era in which U.S. interventions may be seen as important but not vital. In such in-
stances, U.S. leaders, supported by public opinion, may be willing to use military
force for humanitarian reasons.17
Setting Power and Priorities: The Hierarchy of Interests
Interests are a starting point, not an end state. At its simplest understanding, the
national interest demands that a state be willing to uphold its moral and na-
tional values with its treasure, blood, time, and energy, to achieve sometimes
specific and sometimes unspecific ends. National interests reflect the identity of
a people—geography, culture, political sympathies, and social consensus, as well
L I O T T A 1 2 9
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as economic prosperity and demographic makeup. Thus, national interests con-
stitute little more than a broad set of often abstract guidelines that allow a nation
to function the way it believes it should function. National interests also answer
the fundamental but essential question, “What are we willing to die for?”
Hans J. Morgenthau, the classic realist thinker, saw two levels of national in-
terest, the vital and the secondary.18 Vital interests assure a state of its security,
the defense of its freedom and independence, protection of its institutions, and
enshrinement of its values. Vital interests also negate compromise; they repre-
sent issues over which the state is willing to wage war. Secondary interests are
more difficult to define, except that they involve compromise and negotiation.
How a nation identifies such vital and secondary interests has to do with the
kind of national identity—or polity, as Aristotle termed it—its people want to
assume for themselves. This identity can change over time. America, for exam-
ple, has not been since the 1940s the isolationist nation it once prided itself on
being. In 1941, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt jointly pro-
claimed, in the Atlantic Charter, the liberal principles that would guide the post–
World War II world. In 1944, representatives at the Bretton Woods conference
established the core principles of economic order that are embodied today in the
World Trade Organization; that same year, political leaders at Dumbarton Oaks
presented aspects of a vision of future order in their proposals for a United
Nations.
What America became committed to in the postwar order was a broader in-
ternationalist conception of vital interests that was in many ways antithetical to
the isolationist leanings of the founders of the American republic. George Wash-
ington’s farewell address revealed a preference for American national interests
that seems oddly out of place in today’s environment: “Europe has a set of pri-
mary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must
be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign
to our concerns.”19 If anything, Europe’s interests—as a result of both common
histories and struggles—are now at the core of American interests.
It seems significant, therefore, that the Bush NSS does not precisely define na-
tional interests in its introductory session, “Overview of America’s National
Strategy,” and instead refers to “American internationalism that reflects the
union of our values and our national interests”—“political and economic free-
dom, peaceful relations with other states” and “the non-negotiable demands of
human dignity.” (By contrast, the previous Clinton strategies prioritized inter-
ests in categories termed “vital,” “important,” and “humanitarian.”) Indeed, not
until much later in the Bush document is a distinction even made between val-
ues and interests:
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In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate
poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human
dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and
American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others
for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together
with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build
indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforce-
ment and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.20
Core Strategic Interests and Interests of Significant Value
At their most basic and abstract level, U.S. national interests in the contempo-
rary world are simple to describe: to ensure the security and prosperity of the
American people in the global environment. But distinguishing core strategic
interests from significant interests that might require the United States to com-
mit its treasure, blood, time, and energy is almost never easy. Indeed, the misrep-
resentation of what constitutes a national interest may well embody the central
strategic dilemma the United States faces in this next century. It was no accident
that political scientist Arnold Wolfers, five decades ago, referred to the concepts
of “national security” and “national interest” as “ambiguous symbols.”21
More frequently than often admitted, policy makers cannot know exactly
how a potential crisis may impact the real national interest. Even seemingly ob-
jective and clear “threats” are difficult to sort through. The connection between
Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait and Serbia’s refusal to sign the 1999 Rambouillet
agreement may involve a difficult chain of causes and events that must be dealt
with in relation to the idea of “interest”:
Different people see different risks and dangers. And priorities vary: reasonable peo-
ple can disagree, for example, about how much insurance to buy against remote
threats and whether to do so before pursuing other values (such as human rights). In
a democracy, such political struggles over the exact definition of national interests—
and how to pursue them—are both inevitable and healthy. Foreign-policy experts
can help clarify causation and tradeoffs in particular cases, but experts alone cannot
decide. Nor should they. The national interest is too important to leave solely to the
geopoliticians. Elected officials must play the key role.22
The three-tiered approach to assessment of interests as basis for action for
policy makers, strategists, and force planners is meant to illustrate this necessar-
ily complex process. The first tier resembles Donald Neuchterlein’s hierarchy of
intensity and applicability.23 This “sliding matrix of interests” (figure 2) suggests
that nominal issues under the rubric of “favorable world order” (support for hu-
man rights, sovereignty versus individual liberties of the citizen, and control or
prevention of intrastate conflict) can also have direct implications for core stra-
tegic interests.
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Issues such as “favorable world” or “promotion of values” can enter the realm of
vital, core strategic interests more often—and more quickly—than is commonly
thought.24 When a situation becomes so significant that policy makers are unwilling
to compromise, the issue—no matter how seemingly peripheral or secondary—
becomes a core strategic interest. Witness Kosovo in 1999, for example: NATO na-
tions, by effectively declaring war against Yugoslavia on 24 March, were acting both
in the “self-interest”of NATO and European security and, equally, in support of hu-
man rights and individual freedoms. Nonetheless, the world community’s obliga-
tion and mandate to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide whenever able—and to
ignore the sovereignty of individual states, if necessary—seem far from certain.
Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright was far less confident when
speaking about the potential for such “new” doctrine: “Some hope . . . that Kosovo
will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution
against such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. Decisions on
the use of force will be made . . . on a case-by-case basis.”25 Former national secu-
rity advisor Sandy Berger, a month later, complicated the case for humanitarian
intervention by suggesting (in the specific case of East Timor) that the United
States should “weigh its national interests” in a country before deciding to use
military power.
In practice, “case-by-caseism” and humanitarian intervention anytime/any-
where prove equally problematic. The above examples, far from implying vacil-
lation by decision makers, only suggest how difficult it is initially to distinguish
between core strategic and significant value interests (or what others have
termed “vital” and “secondary” interests).
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Thus, aside from determining a first-tier order that provides the decision maker a
useful, systematic means to think about interests, there should be a second tier for
assessing how aspects of such interest will affect policy decision, implementation,
and overall strategy. The table in figure 3 is meant to illustrate this difficulty.
Two pertinent examples of how focus, influence, importance, and attention
to interests develop over time can be drawn from American involvement in the
Balkans during the 1990s. In 1994, as Bosnia-Herzegovina descended into com-
plete chaos and Great Britain and the United States came to loggerheads over
whether or not NATO should intervene in the former Yugoslavia, President
Clinton declared that “Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving”
problems in the Balkans.26 By 1995, the president was declaring that the former
Yugoslavia, being within Central Europe, was “a region of the world that is vital
to our national interests.”27 During the intervening months, events themselves
had not changed so much as the American perspective on the need for interven-
tion in the former Yugoslavia. Put another way, not only had American interests
moved from significant to core strategic (or from “secondary” to “vital”) but the
focus had shifted from general to specific.
This second-tier “taxonomy of interest” can also point to some difficult rec-
ognitions (and seeming weaknesses) in strictly categorizing interests in all spe-
cific instances. The United States, for example, felt the sting of the “Kosovo
effect” in late 1999 when Russian decision makers informed the Clinton admin-
istration that they were following in Chechnya the example of NATO intervention
in the Balkans (by declaring both the interest-based need to protect sovereign
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Source: With the exception of the “influence” interest proposed here, these interest types have been adapted from works of Hans
J. Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States,” American Political Science Review 46 (1952),
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1964), p. 203; and A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969).
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Russian territory and the “human rights” of Russian citizens) as Russian
airpower systematically destroyed the capital, Grozny, and its vicinity, leaving
tens of thousands of refugees and a ruined Chechnyan infrastructure. One Rus-
sian diplomat is said (the anecdote may be apocryphal) to have asked a U.S. State
Department official what the difference between Kosovo and Chechnya was and
to have received the reply: “You [Russians] had nuclear weapons.”28 Similarly, in
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the Indian defense minister, when asked
what single lesson he had learned from the “international community” inter-
vention against Iraq, responded, “Don’t fight the United States unless you have
nuclear weapons.”29
Such contentious responses to the application of American power that sup-
ports U.S. interests prove useful for appreciating the complexity of national in-
terests under strategic uncertainty. Distinguishing how such second-tier
categories of interest conflict with initial first-tier interest-level assessments fur-
ther sharpens the useful recognition that interests are not always in harmony,
policy decisions are difficult and often nuanced, and strategy can at times seem
hypocritical. While we do not hesitate to impose economic sanctions against
Myanmar for its atrocious human rights record, we refrain from similar sanc-
tions against the People’s Republic of China. The reason is obvious: our eco-
nomic prosperity interests (of core strategic importance, specific focus, and
enduring influence) would almost always predominate over “lesser” interests (of
significant value, general focus, and uncertain duration).
In an ideal world, support for human rights would not conflict with “abso-
lute” interests for which Americans would be willing to die. In Iraq in 1991,
rightly or wrongly, Americans were willing to accept up to ten thousand casual-
ties, but in 1994 they would not have been willing to accept as many casualties to
stem the genocide (over eight hundred thousand deaths) of the Tutsi population
by Hutus. There was one specific reason for this: Americans are reluctant to ac-
cept casualties, or even to intervene, when their only foreign policy goals are
“unreciprocated humanitarian interests.”30
Thus, a third-tier approach to addressing potential interests, strategic impact,
and decision should include a methodology for assessing the relationship of fac-
tors that affect the relative position of first-tier interests. There exists a method-
ology (see figure 4) that is simple and logical and can reveal how seemingly
“lesser” interests can quickly influence “core” interests. A North Korean invasion
of South Korean territory, for instance, would be an event that self-evidently im-
pacted core strategic interests. Yet Eritrea’s continuing disputes with Ethiopia,
Chechnya’s perpetual struggles within the Russian Federation, Islamic revolu-
tionary movements within Central Asia, the inability of the Colombian govern-
ment to limit the growing power of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
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Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberacíon Nacional (ELN), or the sys-
tematic abuse of citizens (or a sector of a population) by a government—all
these require a far more difficult logic chain to determine whether the United
States should act or not.
Understanding levels of importance, the relationship between specific and
general aspects of this perceived importance, and how a potential chain of
linked events might lead to a “reaction” that will impact core strategic interests
should improve determinations of whether an issue requires action for the sake
of interest. The necessary choices a decision maker might face include the fol-
lowing: How plausible are postulated outcomes? How long is the chain of inter-
related events? How far removed are these events from core strategic interests?
How, specifically, will the issue affect obvious (and not so obvious) relationships
to which the United States is committed? If the United States does not act on a
specific issue, what are plausible second, third, fourth, and fifth-order conse-
quences? Ultimately, it is essential to address these consequences with respect to
potential interests. The three-tiered approach attempts a more balanced meth-
odology for a complex process.
Sorting through Interests
At best, the most general set of criteria for which the “traditional” instruments
of power support national interests might be expressed as:31
• Militarily, to ensure American territorial integrity and support for alliances
to which the nation is committed; to safeguard American citizens against
intimidation or attack; to bolster American external interests in concert
with political and economic interests, while fostering a nonbelligerent
engagement with other states, regions, and alliances.
L I O T T A 1 3 5
Immediacy of threat/challenge/opportunity
Geographic proximity that might affect identified interests
Magnitude of challenge to potential interests
Contagion effect and its ability to degrade interests
Connectivity between event and major detriment to interests
(the domino effect)
Source: Partially adapted from Robert D. Blackwill, “A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s
and Beyond,” in Europe in Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe, ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning
(Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, 1993), p. 105. Blackwill, however, focuses perhaps too narrowly on
“threat” assessment.
FIGURE 4
A METHODOLOGY FOR CHAIN REACTIONS:
HOW DOES IT IMPACT “NATIONAL INTEREST”?
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• Politically, to support and preserve American values of freedom, individual
rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the principles of
constitutional liberalism.
• Economically, to sustain individual and societal prosperity through
principles of economic reforms, macroeconomic coordination, and free
market practice tempered by agreed rules, labor and environmental rules,
and regional/international standardization.
As Robert Blackwill notes, the issue of human rights—as one example—con-
nects “directly to U.S. vital and important national security interests/core na-
tional objectives.”32 A national interest may therefore constitute much more than
traditional, narrow realist understandings.
Consider, as an example, the declared interest of “defense of the homeland.” Under a
schema of liberal internationalism, military forces, both as instruments of national
power and in support of other cooperative security endeavors, defend the homeland
by supporting American interests abroad. American power, as part of a democratic
security community, promotes “defense of the homeland” through force presence
and involvement outside America’s borders. Thus, in order to ensure the nation’s ter-
ritorial integrity, forces often will be deployed in instances that do not satisfy, at first
glance, the narrow criteria of “survival” or protection of territorial interest. U.S.
armed forces frequently support American interests by “playing away games.”
Moreover, whether one agrees with the concept or not, there should be some
recognition of how “human security” has entered the arena of state, non-
governmental, and international organizational thinking. In an age when nontra-
ditional threats like terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ethnic
conflict are linked to such security challenges as population growth, environmen-
tal decline, denial of human rights, lack of development, and poverty rates that
foster economic stagnation, social instability, and state collapse, it ought to be ob-
vious that a new set of traditional problems has emerged. These problems require
a fundamental rethinking of interests.
Ultimately, the requirement to state, define, and defend national interests in a
public national strategy should remain. For the United States, stating, defining,
and defending interests in the NSS both demonstrate a commitment to demo-
cratic process and explain how America sees its role in the world. While the
American people by and large wish neither to be neo-isolationist nor to become,
by virtue of the primacy of the United States, a global police force, principles as
well as power constitute the idea of the national interest. It is as if the ghosts of
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were in constant tension, defining
who we are as a people and for what achievable ends we are willing to commit
our means—and what ends are worth dying for.
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